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1. Introduction. The decade since privatisation of the UK electricity industry
provides an important sample over which to measure  productivity growth and
efficiency change in electricity distribution. The core idea of incentive based RPI-
X regulation is to stimulate productivity growth and the convergence of efficiency
change amongst the distribution companies. The X factor may represent the
regulator’s estimate of the potential for productivity growth, and may also be an
instrument for yardstick regulation of these regional distribution monopolies. The
expectations generated by the privatisation programme are of large increases in
productivity.
Several measures of this factor have been carried out. For example, O’Mahony
(1999) estimates that labour productivity in UK electricity supply rose at an
annual rate of 7 percent from 1990-96 while in comparison labour productivity in
manufactuing rose by 3.5 percent per year in the same period. Several earlier
studies (e.g. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1994, 1996, and 1998)) have used
mathematical programming (DEA) or stochastic frontier model (SFM) analysis to
evaluate this efficiency change in the regulated electricity distribution industry
with conflicting results. In the immediate aftermath of privatisation productivity
growth seemed not to differ markedly from pre-privatisation experience, but,
subsequently, considerable improvement can be seen. This study uses Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) growth  measured for the regulated companies using
Malmquist indices. The TFP allows for both technical change and efficiency
change and incorporates quality of supply variables. Previous work suggests the
possibility of a correlation between efficiency change and productivity growth on
the one hand and the state of the business cycle on the other. The full decade
sample allows us to measure these effects over a whole business cycle, and to
infer conclusions about the relevance of the timing of periodic regulatory reviews.
2. Models for Measuring Productivity Growth. The standard analysis of
productivity growth in economics starts from the growth accounting approach
used by O’Mahony. Productivity change measures the rate of increase in outputs
(yr) relative to inputs (xi) by estimating total factor productivity, TFP:
                                         
1 Brian Tilley is supported by an ESRC-CASE Phd studentship co-sponsored by Midlands
Electricity PLC.
2 Correspondence: Professor T. Weyman-Jones, Economics Department, Loughborough
University, Leics, LE11 3TU, UK. Email: t.g.weyman-jones@Lboro.ac.uk
3å
å
=
=
=
=
=
mi
i
ii
sr
r
rr
xv
yw
TFP
1
1 [1]
Under the assumption that output and input markets achieve productive efficiency
(output prices equal to marginal cost, input prices equal to value of marginal
product), the weights, wr and vi, applied to outputs and inputs are estimated by
output and input shares in total revenue and costs, resulting in the discrete
Tornqvist index. Productivity growth (the proportional rate of change of TFP)
spills over to consumers in aggregate, and it represents the shift over time of the
production correspondence between inputs and outputs, i.e. technological change.
The underlying assumptions are unlikely to apply to the analysis of privatised
utilities in network industries both because of their residual market power, and
because of their known history of productive inefficiency under state ownership.
Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) indicate how equation [1] can also incorporate
efficiency change as well as technological change if a Malmquist index approach
is used instead. This requires that the output and input weights are estimated
directly, and the non-parametric programming methods of data envelopment
analysis (DEA)  are useful3 for this. A set of panel data on the outputs and inputs
of different firms observed over time is needed, and this is found in the present
application to the productivity growth of regional electricity distribution
companies, RECs, in England and Wales over the period 1990-98. There are 12 of
these companies whose prices are controlled  by RPI-X regulation.
3. Data employed in the study. Real operating expenditure, OPEX, is used as a
proxy for variable input quantity, and is defined as revenue minus operating
profit, current cost depreciation, and exceptional items.  Data were collected from
the regulatory accounts of the RECs for constructing operational expenditure.
This is deflated by a producer price index obtained from the Office of National
Statistics Economic Trends.  The regulatory accounts also include data on tangible
fixed assets.  Costs allocated to the distribution system at the 31st March of each
year provide a value of the capital stock.  This is transformed into real terms by
deflating by the gross investment deflator (GID also from Economic Trends ) to
obtain KSTOCK
The annual Distribution and Transmission System Performance reports from
OFFER4 contain data on area size, customer numbers, overhead circuit,
underground circuit, number of transformers in commission, and aggregate
capacity of the transformers.  The Electricity Association provided data on the
number of units distributed (GWh), and maximum demand.  Condition 9 Reports
                                         
3 Alternatively stochastic frontier measurement (SFM) can be used to estimate the efficiency change
component of productivity growth if relatively strong assumptions are made about the production function
and error distribution, and attention is focused on single output production.
4 Office of Electricity Regulation, otherwise known as the Regulator
4submitted by the distribution business to the regulator contain information on the
quality of supply variables: supply interruptions per 100 customers, customer
minutes lost per customer, and the number of interruptions per 100 customers not
repaired within three hours.
4. The Models tested in the study. The basic model reported here is one of a set
of possible input-output configurations. It incorporates three inputs: operating
expenditure (OPEX), and  the physical capital characteristics of the distribution
network reflecting the total length of the distribution network in each of the
REC’s areas (NET), and the transformer capacity of each REC (CAP).
Distribution models have traditionally specified outputs as electricity units
distributed across the network (UNITS), the number of customers served by each
REC (CUST), and the maximum demand strain placed on each network (MAXD).
All the models analysed in this study follow this approach.
Figure 1 describes mean annual total factor productivity growth for this model for
each distribution business between 1990/91 and 1997/98.  The industry attained
average total factor productivity growth of 6.3%.  However there are large
variations within the industry.  The results indicate a rapid increase in total factor
productivity for some RECs, while others achieve a much slower increase.  The
annual increase of the total factor productivity index is 8.5%, 8%, and 9.4%
respectfully for Eastern, Seeboard, and Southern. In contrast, Northern achieved
modest productivity growth of 3.6% per annum.  There were four companies who
hovered around the industry average, and they were East Midlands, London,
SWEB, and Yorkshire who accrued annual total factor productivity growth of
6.5%, 6.2%, 6.1%, and 7%.  Manweb, Midlands, Norweb, and SWALEC were
configured in a lower cluster rank ranging from 4.7% to 5.2%, considerably
below the average rate of 6.3%.
Figure 1  Annual TFP growth between 1990/91 and 1997/98
Although figure 1 illustrates annual productivity growth, how does the total factor
productivity index vary over this period?  It would be useful to focus on the three
clusters described above to see whether annual growth is consistent or has
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5changed between 1990/91 and 1997/98.  Figure 2 below presents the total factor
productivity results for Eastern, Seeboard, and Southern.
Figure 2  TFP index for the three leading performing distribution companies
Figure 3  TFP index for the middle ranking cluster of distribution companies
Figure 2 indicates that productivity growth for Eastern, Seeboard, and Southern is
relatively flat from 1990/91 to 1992/93.  Eastern start to increase the rate of total
factor productivity in 1993/94, in contrast to Seeboard and Southern who continue
to experience slow productivity growth.  However it is clear that Southern
significantly raise their rate of productivity in 1994/95 as the TFP index jumps
from 1.046 in 1993/94 to 1.27, and this change in the rate of productivity is
maintained until 1996/97.  Seeboard experience a large jump in productivity as
the TFP index increases from 1.18 in 1995/96, to 1.68 in 1996/97.  Eastern
continues to be a leading performer during the entire period since privatisation.
East Midlands, London, and Yorkshire display similar rates of productivity
growth between 1990/91 and 1997/98.  South Western electricity on the other
hand display a different outcome.  Initially the TFP index declines slightly
between 1990/91 and 1993/94, but then increases rapidly particularly between
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61995/96 and 1996/97.  The performance of Manweb, Midlands, Norweb, and
SWALEC is remarkably similar throughout the post-privatisation period as figure
4 demonstrates.  Northern’s performance shadows the trend of this cluster, but at
a lower rate of productivity growth.
Figure 4  TFP index for the lower ranking cluster of distribution companies
Figure 5 presents annual productivity growth over the entire sample period and
two sub-sample periods defined as 1990/91 to 1993/94 and 1994/95 to 1997/98.
The general trend among distribution companies is for much faster productivity
growth after the first distribution price review in 1994.  Pollitt (1997) suggests
that government protection from takeover of utilities after privatisation in the UK
most probably reduced the pressure on distribution companies to remove costs.
Utilities were able to reduce costs considerably after the government sold their
golden shares in these companies. Alternatively Burns and Weyman-Jones (1998)
interpret RPI-X incentive regulation as no more than a binding constraint on
managers engaged in a principal-agent game with shareholders and argue that the
relatively low productivity growth prior to 1994 reflects the lenient X-factor then
in place.
Figure 5  Productivity growth over different time periods for model 1
A downward trend in real OPEX from 1995/96 symbolises how distribution
companies slim-lined their workforce, to improve shareholder value either as an
independent company or as a function of an American holding company.
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7Productivity growth in the privatised electricity distribution industry is
distinguished between innovation and diffusion of technology and best practice.
appears that all of the observed productivity growth is associated with the industry
moving onto a higher frontier.  Figure 6, in which the Malmquist index M is
decomposed into efficiency change, MC, and technological change, MF, shows
that in contrast, none of the productivity growth is due to improvements in
efficiency.  The relative importance of the frontier shift effect suggests that the
industry as a whole is responding to the technical efficiency incentives of
privatisation, but the different regional distribution companies are not
experiencing the rivalry pressures which would ensure a greater number of RECs
drew closer to the frontier.
Figure 6  Malmquist indices for the average distribution company
Given the increases in productivity growth since 1994/95, it is difficult to believe
that there has not been an increase in the concentration of the distribution
businesses closer to the frontier.  The process of privatisation which places more
emphasis on managers to maximise profits, and a clearer incentive based
regulatory system have encouraged the increase in technical efficiency across the
industry.  Yardstick competition envisaged by the regulator was supposed to
increase incentives for managerial efficiency, and reduce the dispersion between
the regions.
5. Panel Regression Analysis
The results5 can be used to investigate the sources of productivity growth. TFP
indices for the twelve distribution companies are regressed against variables that
may influence the rate of growth in a log-linear functional form.  This does not
require the use of limited dependent variable regression in contrast to a linear
functional form where the TFP index will have to meet the condition of 0³TFP .
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8Endogenous growth theory says that TFP growth depends on the variables in the
model and the system.  In the context of this study they are the economic
institutions (timing of the regulatory price control review), input scale and output
scale. A panel regression is constructed to investigate what factors contribute to
TFP growth, and to test for a structural break after the second distribution price
control.  The number of observations in the panel is [ ]96128 =´=´ nt .  Figure 7
describes the disaggregated TFP growth function.  Output growth is the
summation of input growth and TFP growth, and TFP growth is efficiency change
plus technical change.
Figure 7  Endogeneous growth model
The model for each distribution company i is expressed as:
ititiit uxY +¢+=
* ba                            [2]
where [ ]b ¢  is a ( )K1´  vector of constants, [ ]*ia is a ( )11´  scalar constant
representing the effects of those variables peculiar to a distribution company, and
[ ]itu  explains the effects of omitted variables that are peculiar to individual
distribution companies and time periods with the characteristics:
( ) ( ) ( ) ji if  0 ,  ,0 2 ¹=¢=¢= jiuiii uuEuuEuE s [3]
The fixed-effects model exhibits best linear unbiased estimates, while random
effects assume there is correlation among residuals of the same distribution
company.  The covariance estimator from the fixed-effects model is unbiased, and
is consistent especially when the time or cross-sectional observations are large.
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9An advantage of panel data is that if the effects of omitted variables are constant
for a distribution company through time, this problem is eliminated by using
dummy variables to capture the effects of individual-invariant and time-invariant
variables.  In panel data, the structure of the residuals is of interest.  First the
errors may be heteroscedastic across the cross-sectional properties.  Three
techniques are employed to test for groupwise heteroscedasticity, based on
equality of variance across the cross-sections: Bartlett, Levene, and Brown-
Forsythe.  If there is evidence of groupwise heteroscedasticity, feasible
generalised-least squares (FGLS) is applied to the panel regression.
The first panel regressed TFP6  against operating expenditure (OPEX), capital
stock (KSTOCK), units distributed (GWH), maximum demand (MAXD),
regulatory timing dummy (REG), customer density (CUSDEN), customer minutes
lost (AVAIL), number of supply interruptions (SECUR), and the number of
interruptions not restored after three hours (FAULT). The three tests of equality
of variances between the distribution companies reject the null hypothesis of no
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity at the 5% level of significance:  Bartlett
( )0005.04.33 , Levene ( )0004.057.3 , and Brown-Forsythe ( )0092.049.2 .
Consequently FGLS estimators are used to correct for this.
Table 1 Panel Regression Results for Fixed Effects Model
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
OPEX -0.003014 0.000129 -23.40091 0.0000
KSTOCK -2.18E-05 6.35E-06 -3.430713 0.0010
GWH 1.23E-05 4.50E-06 2.726879 0.0080
MAXD 1.11E-05 1.16E-05 0.960921 0.3397
REG 0.013662 0.005598 2.440587 0.0170
CUSDEN -3.17E-05 0.000174 -0.182294 0.8558
AVAIL -1.04E-05 3.57E-05 -0.292005 0.7711
SECUR -0.000231 0.000114 -2.022228 0.0467
FAULT 0.000699 0.000740 0.945344 0.3475
Generalised least squares fixed-effects panel regression (1)
The results show that real OPEX, capital stock and the number of supply
interruptions are negatively correlated with log(TFP), whereas the number of
electricity units distributed (GWh) is positively correlated with log(TFP).
Furthermore the results support the view that there is a structural break in the TFP
index after the second distribution price control in 1995.  After 1995, the TFP
index is significantly higher, and provides statistical support to comments made
by Pollitt (1997) suggesting the government’s holding of golden shares in the
newly privatised electricity companies acted as a constraint on productivity,
because there was no threat of takeover.
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A Wald test is used to test the following restrictions on the coefficients of some of
the variables:
0FAULT 0,AVAIL 0,CUSDEN ,0MAXD ====
with test statistics ( )31.022.1=F  and ( )3.089.42 =c .  Therefore removing these
four variables will not significantly change the nature of the panel regression at
the 5% level of significance.
A growing economy will increase the number of new business opportunities and
create confidence for market players reflected in higher levels of investment.  A
knock-on effect of higher economic activity is an increase in the level of
electricity demand.  Therefore periods of high economic growth between 1993
and 1997  will impact favourably on the total factor productivity (TFP) index
from the panel regression in table 1 above.  Conversely when the economy is in a
downward phase of the business cycle in 1991and 1992 electricity units
distributed can be expected to decline, thus having a negative impact on the (TFP)
index. Table 2 reports the effect of using real GDP to explain TFP, and a similar
effect is obtained if a relative business cycle variable is used instead7.
Table 2 Panel Regression Results for Fixed Effects Model with Business Cycle
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.
OPEX -0.003002 9.34E-05 -32.12958 0.0000
KSTOCK -1.86E-05 3.65E-06 -5.094956 0.0000
GDP 2.64E-05 3.29E-06 8.023070 0.0000
REG 0.013445 0.003032 4.434511 0.0000
SECUR -0.000125 4.61E-05 -2.699029 0.0085
Generalised least squares fixed-effects panel regression (2)
Following the procedures by Fare and Grosskopf (1996), the bias of technical
change is decomposed into an output bias and an input bias. Input bias i  unitary
but most of the productivity gains caused by the frontier shift, which explain
industry gains, are due to the presence of an output bias.  This confirms that
electricity output (kWh distributed) plays a significant part in the advancements in
productivity.
6. Some Conclusions. The price control after privatisation allowed for higher
revenues to be collected from customers to reinforce the network and capital stock
increased considerably between 1990/91 and 1994/95.  Therefore a conclusion
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that may be drawn is that the distribution companies have used the generous price
cap to undertake investment in the local networks, and have presided over
improvements to all three quality indicators.  Progress in the quality of supply was
greatest during the first year after privatisation, which coincided with very large
increases in capital stock by the RECS averaging 24%.
The RECs appear to have compensated for a tightening in the price control by
reducing capital stock in 1995/96 and 1996/97, which may be due to
improvements in operating efficiency.  The present price control includes a capital
expenditure allowance of £2.30 per customer per annum at today’s prices, for
quality of supply measures.  A survey in early 1999 for OFFER showed that
customers were not prepared to accept reductions in quality levels.
More generally we can see that:
· productivity growth is still relatively dispersed which suggests more scope for
yardstick regulation
· the business cycle impacts on measured productivity growth which makes
forward looking regulation problematic
· calculation of relevant incentive based X factors will remain a difficult
problem for the foreseeable future in the regulated network distribution
industries.
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